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pesticide drift, and also failed to sufficiently analyze potential
mitigation measures.
JaredEllis

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the limitation on actions provision of the Clean Water Act may
preclude a citizen suit only if the state laws under which the state is
bringing or has brought the enforcement action contain public
participation provisions that are roughly comparable to the analogous
Clean Water Act provisions).
Kim McAbee commenced a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") against the City of Fort Payne, Alabama ("City") for violation
of their state issued National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permit ("NPDES"). The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama denied the City's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the public participation provisions of the Alabama
Environmental Management Act and the Alabama Water Pollution
Control Act were not comparable to the CWA provisions, and did not
preclude McAbee from bringing a citizen suit. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court, holding the statutes were not comparable as a matter
of law.
McAbee alleged that the City violated its NPDES issued by the State
of Alabama. At the time McAbee filed suit, the City was already
operating under an enforcement order issued by the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management for a number of previous
permit violations. The final order provided for a monetary penalty to
be assessed against the City and ordered the City to provide notice of
the violations and penalties in the newspaper. The City's news article
stated the name of the plant and the penalties imposed, but did not
provide notice that citizens wishing to appeal the penalties and
findings stated in the enforcement order had only fifteen days to raise
such appeals.
The "Limitation on Actions" provision in the CWA precludes
citizens from bringing citizen suits for CWA violations provided the
state is diligently prosecuting an action or has issued a final order
under state law comparable to the analogous CWA provisions.
Therefore, the issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in
holding that the Alabama statutes were not comparable to the CWA
provisions. The court rejected the City's argument that the statutes
need only be comparable as a whole, and held that each provision in
the state law should be "roughly comparable" to the equivalent CWA
provision. Applying the test of rough comparability, the appellate
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court found that the state statutes regarding public participation in
enforcement actions were inadequate to warrant precluding a citizen
suit. The court reasoned that the ex post facto nature of the Alabama
notice provisions were not comparable because the analogous CWA
provisions provided notice to the public and the ability to present
evidence in hearings prior to issuance of the final order. The court of
appeals additionally held that fifteen days was an unreasonable time
for the public to make proper requests for a hearing to appeal the
decision on the final order. Consequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
summary judgment and held that the public participation and notice
sections of the statute were not comparable with the analogous CWA
provisions. Thus, McAbee's citizen suit could proceed as a matter of
law.
Holly Shook

FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. C1. 570 (Fed. C1. 2002) (holding that
continual beneficial use of water for ranching established vested water
rights and that because plaintiff possessed rights-of-way to ditches
under the 1866 Ditch Rights-of-Way Act, he need not prove that the
ditches remained in the same beds).
E. Wayne Hage and the Estate of Jean N. Hage ("Hage") sued the
United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims seeking
damages for unconstitutional takings of: (1) vested water rights in the
Southern Monitor Valley; (2) vested water rights in the Ralston and
McKinney allotments; (3) ditch rights-of-way; (4) grazing permits; and
(5) a surface estate. The United States moved to dismiss. The court
deferred claims regarding takings and compensation, and focused
solely on whether Hage demonstrated a property interest, and the
scope of that interest. The court found that Hage possessed vested
water rights in both the Southern Monitor Valley and the Ralston and
McKinney allotments and rights-of-way to three ditches and therefore
denied the United States' motion to dismiss with regard to these
claims. The court found that Hage possessed no rights to grazing
permits or a surface estate and granted the motion to dismiss with
regard to these claims.
Hage owned the Pine Creek Ranch in Nevada, and filed suit
alleging takings in 1991 because the government revoked his grazing
permits; diverted the water on his grazing allotments; blocked access to
ditches; allowed other species to use the water reserved for his cattle;
impounded his cattle; deprived Hage of the economic use of the
ranch; and owed Hage for improvements made to the rangeland. In
1996, the court partially granted the United States' motion for

